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Environmental Law
I. COURT ADDRESSES COMMON LAW NUISANCE
LIABILITY IN HAZARDOUS WASTE SUITS

In Clark v. Greenville County' the South Carolina Supreme Court
addressed common law nuisance as a cause of action in hazardous waste suits.
The court also discussed causation requirements in actions for environmental
damage and the proper use of affidavits in summary judgment motions.
To resolve the nuisance claim, the court held that a defendant with no
control over property, who is allegedly causing a nuisance, is not liable. A
hazardous waste generator avoids nuisance liability if the generator does not
control either the waste itself or the land on which the waste resides at the
time of the alleged nuisance. 2 The ruling logically extends prior South
Carolina law, adopting precedent from other jurisdictions.
In reaching the nuisance holding, the court addressed important questions
of evidence and procedure. On the evidentiary issue, the supreme court
required a causal connection between the alleged damage and the alleged
source of injury.' In addition, the court reaffirmed and clarified the "most
probably" standard of causation for expert opinion testimony.4 On the
procedural question, the court refused to accept as evidence of material fact
an affidavit that merely referred to evidence expected from expert witness
depositions. 5
Greenville County operated Simpsonville Landfill Number One from 1960
to 1972. Adjacent landowners complained of property damage and brought
actions against the county and against various corporate generators of
hazardous waste deposited at the site. The appellants sued the county for
inverse condemnation and the generators for nuisance, negligence, trespass,
and strict liability. By summary judgment, the lower court dismissed all
causes of action brought by appellants because they failed to produce any
evidence of damage caused by the landfill. The lower court also dismissed all
but one of the nuisance claims against the generators because the generators
did not control the waste or the landfill at the time of the alleged nuisance.6

1. __ S.C. __, 437 S.E.2d 117 (1993).
2. id. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 119.
3. Id. at__, 437 S.E.2d at 119.
4. Id. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 119.
5. Id. at__, 437 S.E.2d at 118.
6. Clark, - S.C. at_, 437 S.E.2d at 118.
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The supreme court phrased the appellant's exceptions as follows: (1) the
trial judge failed to consider water samples taken from the landowners'
property, (2) the trial judge should have considered "evidence" in the affidavit
of appellant's counsel offered in opposition to summary judgment,7 and (3)
the trial judge disregarded deposition testimony and answers to interrogatories
in deciding the summary judgment motion.8
On appeal the court dismissed the test results for failure to show
causation. "[Wjhile the raw figures may indicate contamination, the analyses
of these figures indicate no connection to the landfill."' The appellants' data
showed the presence, but not the origin, of contamination; the lack of any
causal analysis and the presence of other potential contamination sources
proved fatal for the appellants' case. 10
The affidavit of the appellants' counsel failed under South Carolina's
procedural rules. Rule 56(e)" requires that affidavits in opposition or in
support of summary judgment motions be based on the affiant's personal
knowledge. Also, the affidavit must set forth facts admissible into evidence.
The attorney's affidavit merely referred to experts who would
testify on the appellant's behalf, and thus, the court held that the "[c]ounsel's
statement [was] clearly insufficient. . . .
The court discounted the appellants' answers to interrogatories and expert
witness depositions. 4 "Bald allegations of diminution in property value are
insufficient to create a genuine issue of fact regarding damages absent any
competent evidence showing the existence, amount, or causation of damages."'" One expert's testimony failed because it contained no opinion on

causation. 16
The other expert discussed the contamination source; however, he did not
satisfy South Carolina's "most probably" standard for an expert's opinion on
causation. " The standard requires expert testimony to "state that the result

7. On appeal, the appellants did not actually claim that the attorney's affidavit contained
evidence of damage. Brief of Appellant at 10-13. The appellants argued that the affidavit
pleaded to postpone summary judgment, because the affidavit referred to expert witness
depositions taken but not yet published. Id. at 13.
8. Clark, - S.C. at_, 437 S.E.2d at 118.
9. Id. at __, 437 S.E.2d at 118.
10. See id. at __, 437 S.E.2d at 118.
11. S.C. R. CIV. P. 56(e).
12. Clark, _ S.C. at_, 437 S.E.2d at 118.
13. Id. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 118 (citing Baughman v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 306 S.C.
101, 410 S.E.2d 537 (1991)).
14. Id. at _,
437 S.E.2d at 118. The court analyzed the expert testimony but did not
discuss the answers to interrogatories. See id. at _, 437 SE.2d at 118-19.
15. Id. at_, 437 S.E.2d at 118 (citing Baughman, 306 S.C. 101, 410 S.E.2d 537).
16. Clark, - S.C. at _,
437 S.E.2d at 118.
17. Id. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 119.
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'most probably' came from the cause alleged.""8 The second expert stated,
"I would say an important assumption here would be that the source of
contamination of the materials ... was the landfill. ... The nature of the
[waste] . . . is not completely clarified. So in the absence of specific
information, we would have to assume a potential for the worst." 19 Holding
that the expert made an assumption and not a causal connection as to the
contamination's source, the court found the testimony insufficient. °
The trial judge granted the generators' motion for summary judgment on
all but one of the nuisance claims, emphasizing that the respondents never
owned, designed, constructed, operated, maintained, or closed the landfill.21
The court noted also that the respondents did not use the landfill during the
appellants' ownership of nearby property.' The supreme court concluded
that "the trial judge correctly ruled the corporate respondents could not be
liable for nuisance because they had no control over the property allegedly
used as a nuisance."23
The court's analysis began with a nuisance definition. A private nuisance
"arises from the unreasonable, unwarrantable, or unlawful use" of real or
personal property by the owner.24 "Nuisance law is based on the premise
that '[e]very citizen holds his property subject to the implied obligation that he
will use it in such a way as not to prevent others from enjoying the use of
their property. '"'
The court then referred to South Carolina precedent that found that
"complete control" over property creates liability for any property use
breeding a nuisance.2" Liability accrues even if the party with complete
control did not create the nuisance.2 7

18. Id. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 119 (citing Baughman, 306 S.C. 101, 410 S.E.2d 537). In
Baughman the court stated:
It is not sufficient for the expert... to testify merely that the ailment might or could
have resulted from the alleged cause. He must go further and testify that taking into
consideration all the data it is his professional opinion that the result in question most
probably came from the cause alleged.
Baughman, 306 S.C. at 111,410 S.E.2d at 543 (quoting Eubanks v. Piedmont Natural Gas Co,
198 F. Supp. 522, 526-27 (W.D.S.C. 1961))(emphasis added) (alterations in the original).
19. Clark, _ S.C. at_, 437 S.E.2d at 119.
20. Id. at_, 437 S.E.2d at 119.
21. Id. at_, 437 S.E.2d at 119.
22. Id. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 119.
23. Id. at_, 437 S.E.2d at 119.
24. Clark, _ S.C. at __, 437 S.E.2d at 119 (quoting Peden v. Furman Univ., 155 S.C.
1, 16, 151 S.E. 907, 912 (1930)).
25. Id. at _,
437 S.E.2d at 119 (quoting Peden, 155 S.C. at 16, 151 S.E. at 912)
(alterations in original).
26. Id. at_, 437 S.E.2d at 119.
27. Peden, 155 S.C. at 1, 151 S.E. at 907 (finding lessor may be liable for lessee's creating
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After acknowledging that complete control begets liability, the court

addressed the related question: Is a party with no control over the property
creating a nuisance liable?28 The court answered negatively and looked to
Michigan and Indiana law for support.2 9
Under the "no control" rule, the nuisance claim failed because the

appellants neither alleged nor produced any evidence of30respondents' control

over the landfill or the hazardous waste deposited there.
In alleging nuisance from an adjoining landfill, the appellants followed a
traditional tactic in hazardous waste suits. 31 By requiring the defendants to
control the property causing a nuisance before imposing liability, South
Carolina's Supreme Court adopted a common reply.32
After Clark, potential defendants with no control over hazardous waste

avoid nuisance liability; liability attaches only with complete control.
However, the supreme court did not expressly define when "no control" ends
and complete control begins. The opinion, however, does provide a good
starting point. The court emphasized that the trial judge correctly found no
control by the corporate generators.33 The trial judge held that the appellants

could not maintain a nuisance action because "(1) the corporate respondents

'never owned, designed, constructed, operated, maintained or closed the
landfill' and (2) the corporate respondents did not use the landfill during the
time appellants owned their property.""
The opinion also defines the scope of "property." The court emphasized
that the generators did not control either the landfill or the hazardous waste,
reiterating the rule that both personal and real property can cause a nui35
sance.

a nuisance by playing baseball on leased property).
28. Clark, - S.C. at __, 437 S.E.2d at 119.
29. See id. at _,
437 S.E.2d at 119 (citing City of Bloomington v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 891 F.2d 611 (7th Cir. 1989) (applying Indianalaw) and Stevens v. Drekich, 443 N.W.2d
401 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989) (per curiam)).
30. See Clark, _ S.C. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 119.
31. See, e.g., Westinghouse, 891 F.2d at 614; Kenney v. Scientific, Inc., 497 A.2d 1310
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1985); Kelly v. Para-Chem S., Inc., _ S.C. _, 428 S.E.2d 703
(1993); Baughman, 306 S.C. at 103, 410 S.E.2d at 539; Ravan v. Greenville County, _ S.C.
-,
434 S.E.2d 296 (Ct. App. 1993); Judy A. Johnson, Note, Hazardous Waste Disposal: Is
There Still A Role For Common Law?, 18 TULSA L.J. 448, 452 (1983); Jeff Belfiglio, Note,
Hazardous Wastes: Preserving the Nuisance Remedy, 33 STAN. L. REv. 675, 676 (1981)
("Nuisance has been the most popular doctrine used by the courts in attacking pollution
problems.").
32. See, e.g., Westinghouse, 891 F.2d at 611; Kenney, 497 A.2d at 1310 (findingowners and
operators of landfill, not the generators and transporters of the waste, liable for nuisance).
33. Clark, _ S.C. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 119.
34. Id.at _, 437 S.E.2d at 119.
35. Id. at __, 437 S.E.2d at 119; see also Peden, 155 S.C. at 16, 151 S.E. at 912
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Absolving a hazardous waste generator from nuisance liability initially
appears to be at odds with common nuisance principles. The general rule
provides that the creator of a nuisance does not avoid liability by conveying
the offending property. 6 However, South Carolina is not alone in shielding
a generator with no control over waste from any resulting nuisance liability. 37
Two rationales reconcile this apparent inconsistency. First, Clark
probably does not create an exception at all but instead technically defines
when the nuisance begins. The appellants' cause of action implies that
hazardous waste producers create a continuing nuisance at the time of the
initial manufacturing or disposing of the waste into a landfill. In Clark the
court refused to adopt this proposition and, thus, implicitly found that the
nuisance starts after the landfill operator receives the waste."3
The trend toward holding hazardous waste generators strictly liable also
supports limiting generator nuisance liability. A New Jersey court refused to
hold a generator liable in nuisance for hazardous waste dumped at a landfill.39 However, the court contemporaneously stated that generators remain
strictly liable for any resulting damage.'
Although South Carolina's
Supreme Court has not yet adopted this approach, the South Carolina Court
of Appeals recently noted the trend with apparent approval." As a result,
any advantage gained by deep-pocket generators from the limit on nuisance
liability probably will vanish as strict liability actions increase.
The lack of a causal connection erects an obstacle common to many
environmental nuisance suits:
Even when soil and water tests indicate that dangerous levels of iazardous
substances] are present, the problem of proof remains. The plaintiff still
must demonstrate that those [hazardous substances] are the actual cause of
the injury. The problem of proof is further compounded when the injury
could have resulted from one of several causes. 42
The court's treatment of the appellants' test results vividly demonstrates the
difficulty in proving causation. Even though the test indicated contamination,

(classifying nuisance as unlawful use of property).
36. 58 AM. JUR. 2D Nuisances § 126 (1989).
37. See supra note 32.
38. See Kenney, 497 A.2d at 1324 ("The locus of any nuisance which may have existed was
at the landfill, and any such nuisance was the result of the actions of the landfill's owners and
operators.").
39. Id. The court also shielded waste transporters from nuisance liability. Id. at 1328.
40. Id. The court also indicated that strict liability may apply to a waste transporter while the
transporter controls and possesses the waste. Id. at 1327.
41. See Ravan, _

S.C. at _,

434 S.E.2d at 304-05.

42. Johnson, supra note 31, at 454.
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the analyses of the results failed to draw a causal connection with the
landfill. 43 Other potential sources for the contamination existed, further
damaging the plaintiffs' case.'
The causation standards in Clark differ significantly from those used by
federal environmental law.
Under the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA),45 operators
of waste sites and generators of the hazardous waste are potentially liable for
damage caused by the hazardous substances.46 CERCLA requires a much
looser causal link than Clark: Proof of a direct nexus between a generator's
waste and any resulting environmental harm is not required. 47 A plaintiff
need only show that the substances causing harm are "alike, similar, or of a

like kind to those that were present in a generator defendant's waste or that
could have been produced by the mixture of the defendant's waste with other
waste ..
48 In fact, CERCLA places the burden squarely on the defendant by making the lack of causation an affirmative defense.49 Therefore,

alternative sources of contamination provide significantly smaller obstacles for
CERCLA plaintiffs.
The supreme court followed established South Carolina precedent when
it discounted one expert's testimony for failure to satisfy the "most probably"

43. Clark, - S.C. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 118.
44. Id. at __, 437 S.E.2d at 118.
45. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988).
46. Id. § 9607(a) (2)-(4).
47. United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 169 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490
U.S. 1106 (1989). But cf. Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms, Inc., 689 F. Supp. 1223,
1224 (D. Mass. 1988) (mem.) (requiring proof that waste from first site caused pollution at
second site), rev'd on othergroundssub nom., Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy,
Inc., 889 F.2d 1146 (1st Cir. 1989), on remand, 770 F. Supp. 41 (D. Mass. 1991), aff'd, 972
F.2d 453 (1st Cir. 1992). On appeal the plaintiff in Dedham did not dispute the district court's
finding that the defendant did not cause the pollutants to collect in the plaintiff's water supply.
Instead, the plaintiff argued, and the First Circuit agreed, that proof of actual damage is not
required to recover for costs incurred in response to a "threatened release" of contaminants from
the hazardous waste sites. Dedham, 889 F.2d at 1149, 1154. On remand, the district court
denied recovery because the plaintiff contemplated, and thus incurred the costs of, responding
to the pollutants before the wastes on the defendant'sproperty threatened a release. Dedham, 770
F. Supp. at 42-43.
48. Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 169; see also United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1332
(E.D. Pa. 1983) (mem.) ("Tjo require a plaintiff under CERCLA to 'fingerprint' wastes is to
eviscerate the statute."). CERCLA uses looser causation standards to expand generator liability.
Liability for the cost of a cleanup accrues even if the generator transfers only minuscule quantities
of hazardous materials to a waste site. See United States v. Carolawn Co., 21 Env't Rep. Cas.
(BNA) 2124, 2125-27 (D.S.C. 1984); Wade, 577 F. Supp. at 1339-40.
49. Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 170 ("Congress has, therefore, allocated the burden of disproving
causation to the defendant who profited from the generation and inexpensive disposal of
hazardous waste.").
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rule. In Baughman the supreme court stated, "Our cases generally hold that,
before expert testimony is admissible upon the question of the causal
connection between plaintiff's injuries and the acts of the defendant, the
testimony must satisfy the 'most probably' rule. "0
The court's restatement of the rule in Clarkpotentially adds an important
clarification. In previous applications of the rule, the court did not require
experts to say "most probably" in their testimony. 5 In Clark the expert
assumed that the landfill caused the alleged damage to adjacent property; he
did not affirmatively make the causal connection. 52 In addition to noting the
expert's assumption, the supreme court remarked that "expert testimony must
state that the result 'most probably' came from the cause alleged."" This
language strongly suggests that the court will now require experts to use
expressly the words "most probably caused" to establish any causal connection

between a defendant's behavior and a plaintiff's injuries.
In Clark the holding concerning the use of affidavits follows the general
standard that an affiant may assert only facts within the affiant's personal
knowledge.54 An attempt to present facts not within the affiant's knowledge
will fail as hearsay. 5' Similarly, courts often disregard allusions by attorneys
to deposition testimony taken but not yet filed or published.56
The Clark decision does not address a closely related but distinct issue:
While considering summary judgment, should a court use an attorney's
affidavit referring to deposition testimony not yet in the record, not as
evidence of the truth of the matter asserted, but as evidence that the testimony
occurred?57 One could argue that a deposition taken but not yet filed creates
50. Baughman, 306 S.C. at 111, 410 S.E.2d at 543 (citing Armstrong v. Weiland, 267 S.C.
12, 225 S.E.2d 851 (1976); Martin v. Mobley, 253 S.C. 103, 169 S.E.2d 278 (1969); and
Gambrell v. Burleson, 252 S.C. 98, 165 S.E.2d 622 (1969)).
51. See Baughman, 306 S.C. at 111, 410 S.E.2d at 543 ("In determining whether particular
evidence meets this test it is not necessary that the expert actually use the words 'most
probably."') (citing Gamble v. Price, 289 S.C. 538, 347 S.E.2d 131 (Ct. App. 1986)).
52. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
53. Clark, - S.C. at_, 437 S.E.2d at 119 (emphasis added) (citing Baughman, 306 S.C.
at 101, 410 S.E.2d at 537).
54. See S.C. R. Civ. P. 56(e) (requiring affidavits in support of or opposition to motions for
summary judgement to "be made on personal knowledge, [setting] forth such facts as would be
admissible in evidence, . . . [showing] affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the
matters stated therein").
55. See Yarborough & Co. v. Schoolfield Furniture Indus., 275 S.C. 151, 153, 268 S.E.2d
42, 43 (1980) (refusing to consider attorney's affidavits because they were "conclusory in nature
and based almost entirely on hearsay").
56. See Gilmore v. Ivey, 290 S.C. 53, 58, 348 S.E.2d 180, 184 (Ct. App. 1986); Alston v.
Blue Ridge Transfer Co., 308 S.C. 292, 294-95,417 S.E.2d 631, 632-33 (Ct. App. 1992), cert.
denied (holding depositions not filed but read into record as properly before court).
57. The appellant raised an almost identical issue on appeal: "Did counsel's affidavits
constitute a proper request to the court to postpone or deny summary judgment because of the
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good cause to delay or defeat summary judgment. Rule 56(f) of the South
Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure supports this reasoning:
Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that he
cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify his
opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order
a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken
or discovery to be had or may make such order as is just.58
In Baughman, a case with facts analogous to Clark, South Carolina's
Supreme Court overturned summary judgment for a generator defendant
because the premature judgment precluded the plaintiff from a full and fair
opportunity to complete discovery.59 In Baughman the plaintiff procured an
inadmissible expert opinion. 60 However, the court thought that the evidence
61
highlighted a need for further testing, warranting a delay in judgment.
The attorney's affidavit in Clark potentially qualifies under Rule 56(f) as
a plea for delay to await the publication of the expert depositions. "[C]ourts
have not mandated strict compliance with the technical requirements of Rule
56(f) where . . . the need for further discovery is otherwise made known to
the trial court."62 The attorney's statements in Clark and the expert's
testimony in Baughman were not admissible evidence. However, just as the
evidence in Baughman indicated a need for further discovery, the attorney in

unavailability of expert deposition transcripts?" Brief of Appellant at 1. However, the supreme
court focused on the admissibility of evidence contained in the lawyer's affidavit. See supra note
7 and accompanying text. Most likely, the court did not address the issue because even if the
trial judge had delayed summary judgment until the expert depositions became available, the
finding that causation did not exist would remain unchanged. The supreme court's own review
of causation supports this conclusion. See supra notes 13-19 and accompanying text.
58. S.C. R. Civ. P. 56(f).
59. Baughman, 306 S.C. at 112, 410 S.E.2d at 543-44.

60. Id. at 111, 410 S.E.2d at 543 (finding that expert's testimony failed the "most probably"
rule).
61. Id. at 112, 410 S.E.2d at 543-44. The court provided a test for determining whether a
delay under Rule 56(f) is appropriate:
(1) Has the plaintiff "demonstrated a likelihood that further discovery will uncover
additional evidence relevant to the issue of... causation and that [the plaintiff is] not
merely engaged in a 'fishing expedition,'"
(2) Was the plaintiff reasonably diligent in the pursuit of evidence to establish
causation, and
(3) Was the delay tempered by the complexity of the case and the hardship of
proving causation?
Id. at 112-14, 410 S.E.2d at 544-45 (citations omitted).
62. Id. at 112 n.4, 410 S.E.2d at 544 n.4 (citing First Chicago Int'l v. United Exch. Co., 836
F.2d 1375 (D.C. Cir. 1988) and Snook v. Trust Co. of Ga. Bank, 859 F.2d 865 (11th Cir.
1988)).
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Clark, testifying from his own personal experience and knowledge, proved the
existence of expert depositions that possibly warranted a delay in summary
judgment.
In Clark South Carolina's Supreme Court adopted a new rule for
determining nuisance liability. Also, the court reaffirmed rules for establishing causation and using affidavits. In addition the opinion clarified standards
for expert testimony on causation.
By holding that one who does not control property when the alleged
nuisance occurred cannot be held liable, the court logically extended
precedent. The availability of strict liability against producers of toxic
chemicals supports the "no control" standard. South Carolina's Court of
Appeals apparently has approved this form of liability. Therefore, Clark may
presage a growth in South Carolina of strict liability cases against hazardous
waste generators. The potential rise in strict liability actions would most likely
offset the reduced number of nuisance actions.
The causation rules applied in Clark follow accepted common law
principles. Compared to CERCLA, Clark provides significantly more
stringent causation requirements.
The court strongly suggested a tightening of the technical requirements for
an expert's testimony on causation. To avoid evidentiary and causal
difficulties, experts should explicitly state that a given event or condition most
probably caused a plaintiff's injury.
The court's discussion of attorney's affidavits raises a further question
concerning an attorney's statements in requesting a delay in granting summary
judgment. Rule 56(f) potentially provides a basis for delaying summary
judgment when critical depositions have been taken but remain unpublished.
James H. Fowles, III
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